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Global Interdependence begins with an evocative epi-
taph: “A man without bias cannot write interesting
history—if, indeed, such a man exists.” The quote, which
comes from Bertrand Russell’s memoirs, introduces this
diverse overview of the world after 1945. As editor, Akira
Iriye explains, his biases include a commitment to con-
tributing a fresh perspective on the recent past, a desire
to place this perspective in a truly global frame, and a de-
votion to explicating the layers of transnational history.
Although these layers, which he identifies as geopoli-
tics, economics, the environment, and cultural exchange,
converged at different points after 1945, each has a dis-
tinct story and chronology, and each layer receives sepa-
rate treatment in Global Interdependence’s five chapters.
Readers looking for a new take on the driving force of
history will have to look elsewhere; this is a tome about
interactions. Transnational exchange happened “across
borders, among people and their communities, ideas, and
goods, to such an extent that, whether we are talking
about political, economic, social, or cultural affairs, the
destinies of nations, civilizations, individuals, and the
natural habitat become closely linked” (p. 4). Presented
with an admirable terseness, Iriye’s argument straddles
the line between understatement and provocation: the
world achieved interdependence after 1945.
Clocking in at over nine hundred pages, Global In-
terdependence can be unpacked in various ways. Like
its predecessor, A World Connecting, 1870-1945 (2012),
which was edited by Emily Rosenberg and published in
2012, Iriye’s volume consists of long interpretive essays
that both synthesize recent scholarship and reflect the
predilections of each contributor. Historians of U.S. for-
eign relations will recognize many of the authors—Petra
Goedde, J. R. McNeill, and Thomas W. Zeiler, among
others—and Global Interdependence might be read as an
intervention in U.S. and the world history. That field,
which barely existed a decade ago, emerged arguably
from the confluence of diplomatic history with immigra-
tion and global studies during the early 2000s.[1] When
viewed alongside Rosenberg’s volume,Global Interdepen-
dence provides a capacious starting point to think about
this nascent historiography. The United States percolates
nearly every page of Iriye’s tome, but the authors are
as interested in the world as in the United States. Wil-
fried Loth explores the superpower contest through the
prism of European unity; Zeiler illuminates how Wash-
ington shaped (and was shaped by) postwar capitalism;
McNeill and Peter Engelke place this period in the con-
text of population and energy concerns; Goedde explains
the way diversity and homogenization interacted in the
age of cultural globalization; and Iriye offers a précis on
transnationalism. Paired with Rosenberg, Global Interde-
pendence articulates a vision of the field that is less about
the United States than about the line that defines this cu-
rious category of U.S./world. The book walks this line
expertly—a challenge that has organized recent meetings
of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Rela-
tions (SHAFR)—and does so in a way that showcases the
field’s obvious methodological diversity.[2]The resulting
narrative invites historians to rethink the context around
and the significance of America’s rise to power during
the twentieth century.
YetGlobal Interdependence’s intellectual ambitions go
beyond the United States. Iriye’s volume is the sixth book
of the History of the World series, which he is assem-
bling with Jürgen Osterhammel and publishing jointly
with Harvard University Press and C. H. Beck. Beginning
in prehistoric times, this multivolume project promises
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to articulate a genealogy of a peculiar historical subject:
transnational consciousness. The journal New Global
Studies has cultivated this scholarly agenda since 2007,
feeding on recent writings by Christopher Bayly, Charles
Bright, Michael Geyer, Bruce Mazlish, Osterhammel, and
Saskia Sassen, among others, and Iriye’s book is an elabo-
ration of this larger pedagogical endeavor.[3] World his-
torians will not find references to peripheries, cores, or
longue durées in Global Interdependence, nor will they
learn anything new about the rise and fall of great pow-
ers.[4] Iriye’s project is about connections and interac-
tions. “We need a conceptual hold on the experience
of a world that is defined by its globality,” Bright and
Geyer wrote recently. It is not enough to define this ef-
fort by scale or theory; what is needed is a history that
reveals why communities became interlocked and how
they found meaning in that experience.[5]The History of
the World series might be read as an answer to this clar-
ion call; Iriye’s Global Interdependence undoubtedly has
much to say about the history of “globality” or the hori-
zontal planes of action that give life the globalization ex-
perience. “Post-1945 history shows numerous instances
of incomprehension toward unfamiliar people and ob-
jects,” Iriye admits. But more important is the “growth
of the realization that men, women, children, the spaces
they inhabit, and animals, birds, fish, and plants are all
interdependent beings” (p. 8). The story of this realiza-
tion, unfurled here with editorial acumen, represents one
way to conceptualize global history.
Each chapter provides its own twist on Iriye’s larger
theme. Loth’s piece about the Cold War, for instance,
is an interesting alternative to scholarship about the su-
perpower contest in the Third World. His narrative be-
gins and ends in Europe and explores how American-
Soviet tensions interacted with the rise of an American-
European duopoly and the growth of state-making ex-
periments in Asia.[6] Zeiler’s essay is equally accessi-
ble. Starting with a nuanced portrait of U.S. power af-
ter World War II, he turns attention to political econ-
omy, showing that while the recovery of the industrial-
izedworld erodedWashington’s primacy during the Cold
War, the United States never abandoned its commitment
to opening economic doors around the world. This com-
mitment has been the beating heart of modern globaliza-
tion.[7] McNeill and Peter Engelke shift attention to the
environment and themes of energy consumption, climate
change, and population growth. We are living through
the dawn of the Anthropocene era, they argue, which has
seen humans supplant microbes and orbital wobbles as
the principle cause of environmental change. The bold-
ness of this claim is matched by the authors’ skepticism
toward geo-engineering, giving their essay an ambiguity
distinct from Global Interdependence’s other chapters.[8]
On the topic of culture, Goedde and Iriye provide similar
accounts about non-state activism and global conscious-
ness. Goedde is more interested in women and local tra-
dition than Iriye—her essay wrestles fruitfully with cul-
tural hybridity—but her final conclusions do not depart
from Iriye’s wider assessment of the post-1945 world: in-
terdependence is too big to fail.[9] In the face of a tight-
ening network of people, goods, and ideas, where intel-
lectuals grope daily for a cosmopolitanism that befits our
global condition, these individual chapters ultimately as-
semble to answer the most basic of questions: How did
we get here?
A book this ambitious invites big questions and con-
structive criticism. Periodization, for instance, will al-
ways vex historians and Iriye’s decision to begin this
story in 1945 carries baggage. On the one hand, 1945
is the obvious marker because it marks the origins of
the Cold War. On the other hand, this choice masks
the impact of World War II. While Rosenberg’s contrib-
utors mostly oriented their chapters backward toward
the nineteenth century, treating the Second World War
as an afterthought in the drama of industrialized global-
ization, the gaze here is cast forward toward contempo-
rary times, leaving the most destructive conflict in hu-
man history out of focus for History of the World read-
ers. Considering that conflict’s impact on ideas about
planning and citizenship, this is no small oversight.[10]
One might counter that the arrival of the atomic bomb
operated as a cross-cultural “reset” button, but nuclear
questions are at Global Interdependence’s periphery and
few of its chapters would be less cohesive if they covered
World War II itself. There is even an argument for be-
ginning in 1914. The First Great War not only repudiated
European norms about civilization, but also marked New
York’s arrival as the industrial world’s preeminent finan-
cial center. By 1916 America was the largest economy on
the planet, and even afterWoodrowWilson’s downfall in
1919, the United States continued to influence how coun-
tries came to terms with the vagaries of modern life.[11]
Beyond facilitating a comparison of the 1920s and 1990s,
a history that moved forward from 1914might better illu-
minate the strange careers of import-substituting indus-
trialization, global governance, and postcolonial nation-
alism.[12] What are the trade-offs of dating globality’s
triumph to 1945?
Essay selection is also a topic that invites scholarly
debate. Iriye provides an excellent balance here with two
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chapters about diplomacy and economics, another two
essays about interactions and consciousness, and a mid-
dle piece on the environment. One critique of A World
Connecting was that the essays were inadequately in-
tegrated, and a comparable argument can be made of
Global Interdependence.[13] The contributors occasion-
ally talk past each other and their overlaps—which are
especially evident in the final two chapters—can be frus-
tratingwhen read in light of the book’s omissions. China,
for instance, is everywhere and nowhere. Although Bei-
jing shaped relations between the United States and So-
viet Union and eventually altered the geography of cap-
italism, the country does not receive the same treatment
as Europe and North America, the lodestars of Loth’s and
Zeiler’s chapters respectively.[14] Similarly, the informa-
tion revolution is omnipresent yet opaque. The contribu-
tors are interested in technology but ignore “big science,”
or the story of how public money fused with private re-
search after the 1940s.[15] Change did not just happen,
andwhile treating this marriage as a lubricant of transna-
tionalism may reflect how people experienced new tech-
nology, it also diminishes the political history of inven-
tion and diffusion. Likewise, Global Interdependence han-
dles decolonization perfunctorily. Whereas Rosenberg’s
A World Connecting provided separate essays on state-
hood and imperialism, empire’s end is subsumed here
by the dramatic growth of globalization and the arrival
of transnational consciousness.[16] Essay selection is al-
most too easy to critique in a project with this many
moving parts, but each of these jabs points toward open-
ended questions: Where does power reside in themodern
world? How should global historians balance causation
and description? As narrators, where should we plant
our feet—and who are “we”?
Finally, there is bias. Russell would surely have
thoughts about the above questions and he would be fas-
cinated by Iriye’s answers. Iriye has done much to his-
toricize the global community and his biases are more
interesting than he suggests on Global Interdependence’s
opening pages. There is a Kantianism to his scholar-
ship since the mid-1990s, rooted in a deep, sophisticated
interest in the connective tissue of world affairs. Hav-
ing spent three decades writing about war and conflict—
namely, the American-Japanese antagonism during the
early twentieth century—Iriye’s turn toward transna-
tional history hints at a cosmopolitanism that is both
placid and cavernous.[17] Global Interdependence pushes
readers to think about themselves in the widest possible
frame, urging scholars and laypeople alike to recognize
the essential commonality of humankind—and realize the
relevance of a history of global interdependence. This
sentiment finds expression throughout the current vol-
ume, especially as the contributors move from the histor-
ical past to the political present.[18] It also contrasts with
the recent proliferation of scholarship about inequality,
violence, and imperialism.[19] Indeed, in Iriye’s conclud-
ing chapter one can hear echoes of earlier refrains about
the world’s flatness, which will surely frustrate readers
who have joinedThomas Piketty’s bandwagon or find in-
tellectual sustenance on the pages of n+1 and Jacobin.[20]
My students are certainly angrier than Iriye, even if they
disagree about where to direct their frustration. Most
of them have part-time jobs and outsized loans; they
come to the State University of New York with limited re-
sources and heightened anxieties, and tend to take their
cultural cues from either Bill O’Reilly or Jon Stewart.
Comparable questions inform their interest in and aware-
ness of global interdependence: Will they be better off
than their parents? What will technology change? Can
this planet sustain itself? [21] All of which raises the
specter of politics: In the face of these questions, is Iriye’s
cosmopolitanism too synonymous with the universalism
of a bygone age? Have past experiments with theOutline
of History—predicated on the conviction that transna-
tionalism would cultivate habits coexistence and prevent
the recrudescence of “great” wars—already revealed the
shortcomings in the pedagogical enterprise that animates
History of the World? [22]
Iriye has earned his answers to these questions. Born
in Tokyo on the eve ofWorldWar II, he entered academia
at the Cold War’s highpoint and he has spent a lifetime
reflecting on the themes of Global Interdependence. The
book, and the series to which it belongs, is admirable and
impressive. It challenges U.S./world and global historians
in equal measure, nudging them to see globalization as a
historical object that unifies the disparate insights of po-
litical, social, and cultural history. The individual chap-
ters are excellent. But do not open these pages expecting
a compelling critique of power. Iriye’s call to arms is sub-
tle, mature, and elitist: we are one. The question remains,
is that enough?
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